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Abstract
This paper studies the costs of adjusting employment, distinguishing between ﬁrms’
ﬁring and workers’ mobility costs. We construct a simple dynamic general equilibrium
model of labor demand and supply and show that only the joint response of employment
and wages to ﬁrm level shocks can discriminate between the two types of costs. We use
matched employer-employees data for Italy to estimate the model and ﬁnd that both
types of costs are present, that they are sizeable (in the range of 19,000 euros in total)
and that ﬁring costs account for almost 90 percent of total adjustment costs.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: C33, D21, J63
Keywords: Adjustment costs, mobility costs, matched employer-employees data
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of Italy.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The idea that labor markets deviate substantially from the walrasian competitive allocation
mechanism has a long history in economics. Indeed, much of the macroeconomic debate
on the business cycle originates from it. More recently, dierences in the functioning of
the labor market have been indicated as one of the main factors behind the diverging
economic performances of continental Europe and the US. As a consequence, over the
past ﬁfteen years an enormous amount of research has been devoted to understanding
the microeconomics of the labor market, focusing on the features that make the exchange
of labor services dierent from other economic transactions and better characterized in
terms of employment relationships in contrast to anonymous, spot exchanges. The modern
analysis of the employment relationship puts the existence of frictions in the “creation” and
“destruction” of employment at the very center of its research agenda.
Alongside theoretical developments, over the last decade the availability of data at the
micro level has spurred a number of studies on the costs of adjusting labor, documenting the
existence of nonlinearities and of non-convex costs in the adjustment policies of individual
units (see ? for a survey). This body of work, following the seminal theoretical work of ?,
is cast in a partial equilibrium framework where wage-taking ﬁrms face an inﬁnitely elastic
labor supply curve at the market wage, so that labor adjustments at the ﬁrm level can be
studied in isolation from wage adjustments. On the other hand, the search and matching
literature (?) has shown that, in the presence of frictions, employment and wages are jointly
determined even at the level of the ﬁrm, questioning the unique market wage assumption.
In fact, recent research has documented that, due to frictions, not only employment but
also wages respond to ﬁrm-level conditions. ? document a large heterogeneity in wages
of otherwise identical workers that can be explained by search frictions. Other work has
shown that idiosyncratic shocks to the ﬁrm are partially transmitted to the compensation
of its employees (?, ?), in contrast with the hypothesis that wages are insulated from ﬁrm
level changes in business conditions.
This paper argues that the joint consideration of labor and wages response to ﬁrm-level
shocks can help shed light on the nature of the frictions that characterize the employment
1relation. In particular, our approach allows for the separate identiﬁcation of adjustment
costs internal to the ﬁrm - such as ﬁring and hiring costs - and external to it, i.e. those borne
by the workers due to costly mobility across ﬁrms, such as for search, geographical mobility
and re-training needs. This is clearly an important distinction. Such costs have dierent
implications for the functioning of the labor market and for the design of policies aimed at
improving it, particularly when it comes to the lifting of obstacles to employment or wage
adjustment induced by institutional factors, such as employment protection legislation in
Europe.
We adapt a general equilibrium model developed by ? with ﬁring costs on the ﬁrm side,
mobility costs on the workers’ side and idiosyncratic shocks to labor demand. The model
features patterns of adjustments that deviate from the frictionless paradigm in important
ways. Most importantly, it shows that both internal and external costs can generate the type
of employment response to shocks that have been traditionally associated with ﬁring costs,
such as non-adjustment in response to small shocks and lumpiness of labor adjustment.
This implies that the interpretation of the results of the previous literature as evidence of
internal adjustment costs alone might be unwarranted.
While stylized, the model is ﬂexible enough to allow for the structural identiﬁcation
of the adjustment cost parameters and distinguish between ﬁring and mobility costs. It
also allows for a clear and intuitive representation of our identiﬁcation strategy. The idea
behind the empirical test is simple. If mobility costs are important, then an expanding
ﬁrm will need to compensate workers for the mobility cost they bear even if the expansion
is due to a shock that is speciﬁc to the ﬁrm, not to the industry. As Joan Robinson (?)
pointed out seventy years ago, “..there may be a certain number of workers in the immediate
neighborhood and to attract those from further aﬁeld it may be necessary to pay a wage equal
to what they can earn near home plus their fares to and fro”.S t a t e dd i erently, mobility
costs imply an upward sloping supply for labor at the ﬁrm level. When a ﬁrm changes the
level of employment, the workers’ compensation should also change in the same direction if
mobility costs matter, while no change in wages should be observed if the ﬁrm faces only
ﬁring/hiring costs. We therefore supplement the employment adjustment equations on the
2extensive and intensive margin previously used in the literature, which identify the sum of
ﬁring and mobility costs, with a wage adjustment equation, which singles out the mobility
cost and allows to disentangle the two components.
The empirical problem with this approach is that it can hardly be implemented with
a ﬁrm-level measure of the wage, such as the total wage bill divided by the labor force
 the standard measure of wage used in the literature. This measure, in fact, is likely
to be strongly inﬂuenced by changes in employment for reasons that have nothing to do
with mobility costs.1 To overcome this problem we merge company-level data for a large
sample of Italian ﬁrms with social security data on worker-level compensation available for
a random sample of their employees for the 1982-1994 period. The detailed information
at the ﬁrm level allows to compute measures of idiosyncratic shocks to the ﬁrm and then
study the response to these shocks of ﬁrm-level employment and individual compensations
after controlling for workers’ and ﬁrms’ characteristics. We focus on idiosyncratic shocks
for three reasons: ﬁrst, using idiosyncratic shocks we abstract from aggregate events that
might change aggregate labor demand, which greatly facilitates identiﬁcation; second, id-
iosyncratic shocks constitute the bulk of shocks hitting ﬁrms (?) and correspondingly, most
job changes take place locally;2 ﬁnally, there is no evidence on the joint response of wage
and employment to this type of shocks, while some evidence is available on the wage cost
of long geographical (?) or sectoral (?) mobility.
We ﬁnd that total adjustment costs are substantial. According to our preferred esti-
mates, the per capita cost of changing employment is in the order of 19,000 euros, about 13
months of the average gross annual compensation. This ﬁgure is of the same order of magni-
tude as that estimated by ? for France, a country with a labor market similar to the Italian
one. In terms of external and internal costs, both components are present and statistically
signiﬁcant. The internal component accounts for about 90 percent of the total, indicating
that internal costs are a more important impediment to labor adjustment than mobility
1For example, an expanding ﬁrm may hire highly skilled workers and thus pay a wage skill premia which
raises the average ﬁrm wage, generating a correlation between wage and employment adjustment even with
no mobility costs. Moreover, given that the number of employees would appear in the denominator of a
measure of average compensation, any measurement error due to the timing with which employment is
recorded would induce a spurious correlation between employment and wages adjustment.
2For example, in our data 2/3 of those changing job do not leave their province and 3/4 their region.
3costs, which are in the order of 2,100 euros or 1.5 times the average monthly compensation.
This result is robust to a number of extensions, such as accounting for heterogeneity in
m o b i l i t yc o s t sa c r o s sw o r k e r s .
The relatively modest size of mobility costs is consistent with the fact that they are
estimated using idiosyncratic shocks to ﬁrms productivity: given that we are abstracting
from aggregate labor demand changes, an increase in labor demand by an individual ﬁrm
will most likely be satisﬁed within the boundaries of the local market, without resorting to
long distance mobility. This hypothesis is supported by the analysis of mobility patterns in
our dataset, that indicates that workers’ mobility is mostly local. The characterization of
the labor market that emerges therefore is one where workers are reasonably mobile within
locations but scarcely mobile across them.
Our results suggest that mobility costs faced by workers, though less important than
internal costs, cannot nevertheless be neglected, implying that the assumption that ﬁrms
face an inﬁnitely elastic labor supply at the prevailing wage made in the empirical literature
on adjustment costs is misleading, as it tends to overstate the role of hiring and ﬁring costs
internal to the ﬁrm. This has an important bearing on the debate on labor market ﬂexibility.
Our paper adds to the growing literature that stresses the role of frictions in the labor
market. More speciﬁcally, we contribute to the literature that estimates dynamic labor
demand functions with non convex adjustment costs. Within this line of work, our paper
is closer to ? and ? who, like us, account for the endogenous selection of the adjustment
regime. These papers, however, ignore wage responses to shocks. The paper is also related to
the literature on wage responses to labor demand shocks. ? is the ﬁrst to use this approach
to identify mobility costs across local labor markets, deﬁned in terms of US states. Our
approach is similar, but more microeconomic in nature, as we conduct the analysis at the
level of the ﬁrm: in fact, our focus is on the distinction between mobility on one side and
ﬁring and hiring costs on the other. ? also uses ﬁrm adjustment in a wage equation, ﬁnding
that wages are correlated with measures of job creation and destruction at the plant level.
Also related to our approach is ?, who estimate a wage equation together with a mobility
and a participation equation, but they are interested in obtaining an unbiased estimate of
4the return to seniority rather than disentangling the nature of adjustment costs. To our
knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to use employment and individual-level wage data to jointly
estimate wage and employment responses to ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks to identify the nature of
adjustment costs. We also touch on the debate on ﬁrm size/wage relationship. Many papers
have found that large ﬁrms pay higher wages even controlling for workers’ characteristics
(?). In our model, ﬁrms that are expanding must compensate workers for the mobility costs
incurred by the latter and therefore pay higher wages, endogenously delivering a positive
correlation between ﬁrm size and wages.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional framework,
while Section 3 introduces a simple general equilibrium model based on ?. Section 4 details
the data and Section 5 discusses estimation issues. The results are reported in Section 6,
along with sensitivity analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional aspects
Following the literature on adjustment costs at the ﬁrm level, we do not directly measure
costs of hiring, ﬁring and mobility, but rather infer them from the observed responses of
employment and wages to shocks. Such costs do depend on the institutional features of the
labor market: in fact, as other continental European countries, Italy has a fairly regulated
labor market. We thus oer a brief sketch of its main institutional features.
According to Italian employment protection legislation (EPL), dismissals of workers
with open-end contracts are only allowed for misbehavior, or because of the ﬁrm’s need to
downsize or reorganize its activities. Thus, it would not be possible to ﬁre an employee
with a long tenure and a high salary to replace her with a young worker paid the minimum
contractual wage.
Workers can appeal in court against dismissal. No direct cost is imposed on the ﬁrm
when a dismissal is not contested or it is ruled to be fair, although ﬁrms may want to pay
some form of compensation to the dismissed workers in order to avoid litigation (this is
especially true in collective dismissals, when lump-sum payments are sometimes explicitly
bargained with the unions). If the judge rules in favor of the worker, she is entitled to
5compensation that varies according to ﬁrm size. Firms with less than 16 employees must
compensate unfairly dismissed workers with a severance payment that varies between 2.5
and 6 months of salary. Firms with more than 15 employees3 have to compensate workers for
the loss of earnings from the date of the dismissal to the date of the ruling. Moreover, they
are obliged to reinstate the worker, unless he or she opts for a further severance payment
equal to 15 months worth of salary. Because of these dierences, the costs of EPL have been
traditionally thought to be substantially larger for ﬁrms above the 15 employees threshold.
Recent studies that exploit the dierential eects of EPL on the propensity to grow of ﬁrms
just below the threshold have found signiﬁcant but modest eects (?, ?), suggesting that
the dierential eects of EPL on small and large ﬁrms might be overstated.
In terms of wage setting, Italian industrial relations are based on multi-tier collective
bargaining, with economy-wide, industry-wide and company-level agreements. In ? we show
that the latter provide sucient room for wages potentially to respond to idiosyncratic ﬁrm
shocks. According to data from the Bank of Italy survey on manufacturing ﬁrms with at
least 50 employees, approximately 92% of workers were covered by a ﬁrm-level contract in
1994. Data for the Metal products, Machinery and Equipment sector, for which a breakdown
of the wage bill into its various components is available, show that between one sixth and
one fourth of the compensation was ﬁrm speciﬁc in the period covered by our sample (1982-
1994). There is therefore room for wages to have an important ﬁrm speciﬁc component,
possibly related to the ﬁrms’ needs to attract or expel workers following ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks
to labor demand.
There is a widespread consensus that geographical mobility in Italy is low because of
high moving costs. For example, according to a 1995 survey of the National Institute
of Statistics, more than 40% of unemployed workers were unwilling to take a job outside
the municipality of residence and only 22% were ready to move anywhere (?). In fact, high
unemployment rate in the South has persisted in the face of basically full employment in the
rest of the country - that is, large unemployment dierentials persist due to low mobility
3More precisely, the rule refers to establishments with more than 15 employees, and to ﬁrms with more
than 15 workers in the same municipality or with more than 60 employees in all establishments combined.
The digerent provisions according to ﬁrm size are the subject of the hotly contested Art. 18 of the “Statuto
dei Lavoratori”.
6rates. Most of this anecdotal evidence refers to long-distance geographical mobility, not
mobility across ﬁrms within the same local market. Since we focus on idiosyncratic shocks
to ﬁrms, the most relevant concept of mobility for our exercise is across ﬁrms rather than
across geographical areas. In other words, in a certain local labor market ﬁrms that have
received idiosyncratic positive shocks may coexist with ﬁrms that have received negative
shocks, implying that long distance mobility on the workers’ side will not be necessarily
observed.
3 The Model
We adapt a general equilibrium model by ?. Time is discrete. The economy is comprised of
a continuum of inﬁnitely lived ﬁrms and workers. Firms produce output using a decreasing
return to scale technology with labor as the only input and stochastic productivity (or
demand) shocks and face costly labor adjustments; we only consider idiosyncratic ﬁrms’
shocks, i.e. shocks that do not change aggregate productivity and labor demand. Workers
supply one unit of labor inelastically; they can pay a mobility cost c a n dm o v et oad i erent
job, in the spirit of ? island model.
The main simplifying assumption is that productivity at the level of the ﬁrm switches
between two values, %g > %b, following a symmetric ﬁrst order Markov process: Pr{%0 =
%i|% = %i} = p>1
2, i = g,b. A general equilibrium model with non convex adjustment costs
of the type we consider cannot generally be solved analytically; moreover, non-convexities
bring about challenging numerical issues, that are particularly relevant in estimation rou-
tines, where the model has to be solved repeatedly. With this simplifying assumption we
will be able to obtain closed form solutions that, as we will argue, can be seen as approxi-
mations of those implied by a more general model, with the additional advantage of a clear
and intuitive interpretation.
Consider ﬁrst the workers’ problem. Workers cannot save and consume current income.
In each period, a worker is employed in a “good” or a “bad” ﬁrm, which pays wages wg
and wb respectively. In equilibrium the wage ﬂuctuates with the ﬁrm productivity, so that
with probability p  1
2, the wage remains constant to its good (wg)o rb a d( wb)v a l u e ,
7with wg  wb. With probability 1  p, a good (bad) wage becomes bad (good). A worker
e m p l o y e di nab a dﬁ r mc a nm o v ei n s t a n t a n e o u s l yt oag o o do n eb yp a y i n gam o v i n gc o s t
c.4 In a stationary environment, the values of working at a good or bad ﬁrm are as follows:
Ug = u(wg)+ [pUg +( 1 p)Ub]( 1 )
Ub =m a x {u(wb)+ [(1  p)Ug + pUb],u(wg  c)+ [pUg +( 1 p)Ub]} (2)
The ﬁrst expression shows that people that are in a good job draw utility from their wage
u(wg), do not move, and get continuation utility equal to either Ug or Ub with probability
p and 1  p, respectively. The second expression shows that the mobility decision is taken
(and the cost c paid) when expected lifetime utility from moving exceeds that from staying.
In an equilibrium featuring both mobility from bad to good jobs and nonzero employ-
ment in bad jobs, it must be that the workers at bad jobs are indierent between moving or
staying, which implies that the two terms in curly brackets are equal. To allow for analytical
solutions, take the case of linear utility. Then, after some algebra, we obtain:
wg = wb + c (3)
where  =1+ (1  2p). Thus with serially uncorrelated shocks (p = 1
2), to attract workers
the ﬁrm must pay a wage premium that equals the moving cost, wg = wb + c:g i v e nt h a t
next period the state can be good or bad with equal probability, the worker wants to recoup
the cost immediately. For a similar reasoning, with full persistence (p = 1) the ﬁrm only
needs to pay the annuity value of the moving cost: wg = wb+(1)c. ? formally shows that
the wedge between wages implied by equation (3) constitutes a lower bound with respect
to the more realistic case in which workers are risk averse.5
Firms’ productivity shocks are realized at the beginning of the period, before the em-
4The basic formulation assumes homogeneous mobility costs. In appendix B we extend the model to
allow for heterogeneity according to occupational status.
5? shows that consumption falls upon moving: workers are trading og current consumption for expected
future consumption. The expected reward must therefore be larger the more concave the utility function,
because risk averse individuals suger more from a given reduction in current consumption.





Following the literature on ﬁring costs (?), the adjustment cost function is linear in
employment changes:
g(l)=f  l  I{{l<0} + h  l  I{{l>0}
where I{.} is the indicator function, f is the ﬁring and h the hiring cost.6 Firms decide both
whether to adjust when hit by a shock and, in the case they do, by how much.
The state of the ﬁrm is described by the couple (l,%). The general formulation of the
ﬁrm’s problem in recursive terms is
V (l,%)=Maxl0{F(l0,%)  w(l0  l)l0  g(l0  l)+EV(l0,%0)}
where, consistently with the workers’ problem, we allow for the wage to depend on the
labor adjustment. As stated above, this general problem is hard to solve, due to the non
convex nature of the adjustment cost function and to the general equilibrium setting. The
two shocks assumption greatly simpliﬁes the analysis. If ﬁrms adjust when productivity
changes, then in equilibrium employment will also take up two values lg,l b as productivity,
implying four distinct states, (li,%j), i,j = g,b, in which the ﬁrm can be. Moreover, from
the workers’ problem, it follows that ﬁrms that want to expand employment from lb to
lg must increase wages by c to compensate workers for the mobility cost, while, when
ﬁring, a wage reduction of the same amount will make workers indierent between staying
or leaving. The wage rate therefore also switches between two states wg,w b,a sa s s u m e d
above. Note that, once the ﬁrm pays the wage wg, labor supply is inﬁnitely elastic for labor
increases, and the same holds at wb for labor decreases. The value of the ﬁrm in the four
6Following most of the literature, we assume that f (h)i sac o s t sa n dn o tat r a n s f e rf r o mt h eﬁ r mt ot h e
worker. We will discuss in the empirical section the consequences of this assumption. See ? for a model
that studies how the implications of a ﬁring tax diger from those of a severance payment.
9states satisﬁes:
V (li,%i)=F(li,%i)  wili + (pV (li,%i)+( 1 p)V (li,%j)) (5)
V (li,%j)=V (lj,%j)  g(li  lj)( 6 )
for i = {g,b},j = {b,g}. The ﬁrst equation characterizes the value of the ﬁrm when
productivity does not change, so that no employment adjustment is required; the second in
the case that productivity switches, triggering adjustment.
To determine the size of employment adjustment, we use the fact that the marginal value
of employment must equalize the hiring cost when hiring and the (negative of) the ﬁring
costs when ﬁring (see the appendix for details). Then, the optimal employment change
when productivity switches from %g and %b is:
l = !31(%  (c + f + h)) (7)
where we use the notation x = xgxb throughout. The employment change is proportional
to the shock and dampened by the presence of hiring, ﬁring or mobility costs; moreover,
the eects are dampened by the degree of concavity of the production function !.
Consider now the optimality of adjusting. To determine the conditions under which
adjustment is the optimal policy, we use the one-step-deviation condition: if adjustment is
optimal, it must deliver a higher payo than not adjusting and resuming the optimal policy
from next period onward:7
V (li,%j) >F(li,%j)  wili + (p(V (lj,%j)  g(li  lj) )+( 1 p)V (li,%i)) (8)
In the appendix we show that, assuming that the labor force is of mass 1 and ﬁrms are of
total mass 2, the model can be fully characterized and the inequality in (8) directly solved.
7This formulation implies that the ﬁrm takes into account the fact that, when changing employment,
wages change too: in fact, the payog from deviating is computed using the wage that results from not
changing employment. Alternatively, one could assume that ﬁrms take state contingent wages as given, in
which case w would follow the same process as 0 even in the deviating stage. Given that we are considering
ﬁrm-level labor supply, it seems more reasonable to assume that a ﬁrm knows that it has to increase wages
if it wants to increase employment.
10The optimality of adjusting can be expressed in terms of threshold levels for the changes in





















Equations (3, 7, 9, 10) form the basis of the moment conditions we will use in the empir-
ical analysis. They supply two extensive conditions for wages and employment conditional
on adjusting and two intensive conditions for employment for the optimality of adjusting.
Even if derived under the two shocks assumption, they have the same structure that would
result from a model with a continuum of shocks. For example, the partial equilibrium in-
vestment model with a continuum of shocks of ? also delivers a binary condition on the
optimality of adjustment and a size of adjustment condition.
There are some important aspects to notice. First, in all the equilibrium conditions we
are going to use for identiﬁcation purposes, ﬁring and hiring costs enter as sum. This implies
that the model can only identify the total amount of internal adjustment costs, k = h + f,
not its two components. While this is a shortcoming of the model, our primary interest
is in distinguishing internal from external costs, rather than ﬁring from hiring costs. We
thus believe this is a relatively unimportant issue. From now on, we will refer to k as total
internal costs and neglect the distinction between f and h.
Another important aspect is that, given the continuum of ﬁrms assumption and the
symmetric Markov transition matrix, in the aggregate there is a constant and equal share
of ﬁrms in each state. This is therefore an economy with only idiosyncratic shocks, i.e.,
shocks that aect the single production units without altering aggregate outcomes. This
aspect will have a strict counterpart in the empirical analysis, where the shocks will be
deﬁned at the level of the single ﬁrm, after ﬁltering out aggregate and local shocks.
11Finally, our identiﬁcation relies on the fact that ﬁring costs do not enter the wage change
equation. This does not imply that wage levels are independent from ﬁring costs: indeed,
the appendix shows that ﬁring costs increase equilibrium wages; however, they do so exactly
in the same way for wages in good and bad ﬁrms, so that the wage changes are independent
from them.
Summary of predictions
We summarize the predictions that we will use in the empirical analysis. First, in a
frictionless world, in which both k =0a n dc = 0, ﬁrms face an inﬁnite elastic labor supply
at the prevailing wage, which does not respond to the idiosyncratic ﬁrm conditions: w =0 .
Moreover, there is no lumpiness or attenuation in the employment response to shocks:
%W = 0 (11)
l = !31% (12)
The introduction of frictions has several implications. First, the response of employment
becomes lumpy: ﬁrms only adjust when the shocks are suciently large. The smallest
change in the frictionless employment at which adjustment occurs even with frictions is:
e lW = !31%W = H (13)
and similarly for downward adjustment. One important implication of (13) is that any type
of friction induces lumpiness: in fact, from (9) and (10) it follows that e lW 6= 0 if either
c 6=0o rk 6= 0. This implies that lumpy adjustments will signal the presence of frictions,
but cannot be used to determine their nature. This is in contrast with most of the literature
on employment adjustment at the level of the ﬁrm, where lumpy behavior is usually taken
as signaling hiring or ﬁring costs (?).
The second implication relates to employment changes. With respect to a frictionless
world, frictions not only induce lumpy adjustments, but also dampen employment changes
when they take place, as can be seen by expressing actual adjustment in deviation from the
12frictionless counterpart:
l = e l  # (14)
where # = !31(c + k).
The third implication relates to wage changes. Given that ﬁrms need to compensate
workers from the moving costs they bear upon changing employer, wage changes only occur
together with employment changes. Moreover, the wage response to the shocks is due to the
cost of moving: if ﬁring costs were the only friction in the market, then we should observe no
wage response at the ﬁrm level. In particular, one can write w = c for workers employed
in ﬁrms that adjust employment upward, and w = c for ﬁrms that adjust downward.
4D a t a
We rely on two administrative data sets, one for ﬁrms and one for workers. Data for
ﬁrms are obtained from Centrale dei Bilanci (Company Accounts Data Service, or CAD for
brevity), while those for workers are supplied by Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale
(National Institute for Social Security, or INPS). Since for each worker we can identify the
ﬁrm he/she works for, we combine the two data sets and use them in a matched employer-
employee framework. There is a burgeoning empirical literature on the use of matched
employer-employee data sets (See ? for a recent overview).
The CAD data span from 1982 to 1994, a period that comprises two complete business
cycles. It contains detailed information on a large number of balance sheet items together
with a full description of ﬁrm characteristics (geographical location, year of foundation,
sector of operation, ownership structure), plus other variables of economic interest usually
not included in balance sheets, such as employment and ﬂow of funds. Balance sheets are
collected for approximately 30,000 ﬁrms per year by Centrale dei Bilanci, an organization
established in the early 1980s jointly by the Bank of Italy, the Italian Banking Association,
and a pool of leading banks to gather and share information on borrowers. Since the banks
rely heavily on it in granting and pricing loans to ﬁrms, the data are subject to extensive
13quality controls by a pool of professionals, ensuring that measurement error should be
negligible.
INPS provides us with data for the entire population of workers registered with the
social security system whose birthday falls on either April ﬁrst or October ﬁrst. Data are
available on a continuous basis from 1974 to 1994. We use the data after 1981 for consistency
with the timing of the CAD data. The INPS lacks information on self-employment and on
public employment. The INPS data set derives from forms ﬁlled out by the employer that
are roughly comparable to those collected by the Internal Revenue Service in the US.8
Misreporting is prosecuted.
Given that the INPS data set includes a ﬁscal identiﬁer for the employer which is also
present in the CAD data set, linking the employer’s records to the employees is relatively
straightforward. As in other countries where social security data are available, the Italian
INPS data contain some detailed information on worker compensation but information on
demographics is scant.
Table 1 reports various descriptive statistics for the ﬁrms (Panel A) and workers (Panel
B) present in our sample. We report separate statistics for the whole sample and for the
sample obtained after matching ﬁrm and worker information. From an initial sample of
177,654 ﬁrm/year observations, we end up with 116,686, corresponding to 16,037 ﬁrms.
The number of usable observations is less than that due to the dynamics of the estimation
procedure. We exclude ﬁrms with intermittent participation (40,225 observations) and those
with missing values on value added, employment, industry, or geographical area (20,620
observations) or extreme employment changes (123 observations). The panel we create is
unbalanced.
The whole sample ranges from very small ﬁrms to ﬁrms with almost 180,000 employees,
with an average of 204 and a median of 60. As expected, most of the ﬁrms are in the
North (75 percent). As for the distribution by industry, manufacturing ﬁrms account for
about 75 percent of the ﬁnal sample, construction for about 15 percent and the remaining
8While the US administrative data are usually provided on a grouped basis, INPS has truly individual
records. Moreover, in the US earnings records are censored at the top of the tax bracket, while the Italian
data set is not subject to top-coding.
1410 percent is scattered in the service sectors. The matched sample includes larger ﬁrms,
but the distribution by region and industry is similar to that in the whole sample.
Panel B reports sample characteristics for the workers in the 1982-1994 INPS sample.
We start with an initial sample of 267,539 worker/year observations (including multiple
observations per year for the same worker due to multiple jobs, intra-ﬁrm position change,
and inter-ﬁrm mobility) and end up with 255,954. Of these, 125,211 can be matched to
a ﬁrm in the CAD data set. Here as well, the number of usable observations is less than
that due to the dynamics of the estimation procedure. Sample selection is made with
the explicit aim of retaining workers with stable employment and tenure patterns. First
we exclude those younger than 18 or older than 65 (2,652 observations), circumventing
the problem of modeling human capital accumulation and retirement decisions. We keep
only individuals with non-zero recorded earnings in all years (105 observations lost), and
eliminate those with missing values on the variables used in the empirical analysis (8,627
observations). If an individual has multiple spells at the same ﬁrm, we treat each spell as a
separate match. To avoid dealing with complex situations, we eliminate jobs that are held
simultaneously with the main one (i.e., if a person works for a ﬁrm continuously between
1980 and 1992 and has a spell at another ﬁrm between 1984 and 1985, we discard the latter),
and the shorter spells for individuals with overlapping spells at two (or more) ﬁrms (i.e., if
an individual works continuously for one ﬁrm between 1980 and 1992, and continuously for
another ﬁrm between 1983 and 1992, we discard the latter).
Our measure of earnings covers remuneration for regular and overtime pay plus non-
wage compensation. We deﬂate earnings using the CPI (1995 prices). For workers with
intermittent participation we treat two strings of successive observations separated-in-time
as if they pertained to two dierent individuals.
Workers in the whole sample are on average 39 years old in 1991; production workers
account for 62 percent of the sample, 37 percent are clericals, and about 2 percent managers.
Males are 73 percent of our sample and those living in the South 14 percent. Finally, gross
earnings in 1991 are roughly 17,000 euro on average. In the matched sample individual
characteristics are fairly similar to the ones in the whole sample.
155 Identiﬁcation
The identiﬁcation procedure is based on the equilibrium relations obtained from the model.
The most important shortcoming of the simple general equilibrium model is that it has
only two productivity states, a clearly untenable assumption when bringing it to the data.
We depart from the model and generalize this structure by allowing the shock (and the
consequent labor adjustment) to take any value. Without the two-shocks assumption, we
would not be able to directly calculate the value functions and obtain a closed form solution.
Without closed form, the estimation procedure would still take the form of a threshold
rule plus an extensive equation but would require the numerical solution of a nested ﬁxed
point problem, with the additional complexity of determining equilibrium wages.9 While
doable in principle, this would greatly increase the computational complexity and reduce the
transparency of our procedure; moreover, the estimation results would still depend on the
functional form and distributional assumptions. On balance, we believe that the increase
in complexity is not matched by the increase in explanatory power. The main advantage of
the strategy proposed here is that it is simple and transparent without imposing too high
a cost in terms of realism. Indeed, the conditions obtained from the two shocks model can
be thought of as approximations to the exact solution with a continuum of productivity
shocks.
Equation (12) indicates a linear relation between shocks and frictionless labor changes
that we maintain. However, we also include an error term that captures unobserved deter-
minants of frictionless employment change, i.e.,10
e ljt = !31%jt + jt (15)
9The only paper we are aware of that estimates a dynamic programming model of labor demand is ?.
However, they take wages as given at the plant level, and so their setting is partial equilibrium in nature.
Other authors (?) derive an approximated labor demand Euler equation in the presence of adjustment costs.
10For the remainder of the paper i, j,a n dt index workers, ﬁrms, and years, respectively.
16Our theory delivers the adjustment thresholds:










and the wage equation w = c.
We estimate our structural parameters using a multi-step strategy. First, we estimate
the parameters that aect the probability of adjusting using observations on all ﬁrms; then,
the size of adjustment equation using only the observations on the ﬁrms that adjust; ﬁnally,
the wage equation using the individual workers’ data. The parameters we estimate at these
three stages are non-linear combinations of the structural ones; the latter are over-identiﬁed
from these restrictions and therefore we can test the overidentifying restrictions. We use
optimal minimum distance to map reduced form parameters onto structural parameters.
More speciﬁcally, rewrite actual labor adjustment as:
ljt =
;
A A A A ?
A A A A =
e ljt + #
0
e ljt  #
if e ljt < L
if L  e ljt  H
if e ljt > H
(18)
Firms can be in one of three regimes: hiring, ﬁring, or doing nothing. These regimes




































. The likelihood function for the
regime a ﬁrm happens to be in is:
11We only observe net employment changes, so that we deﬁne adjustment based on them. ? estimate the































(k = H,L), and l the
scale factor. Thus, H, L,a n d!31 can only be identiﬁed up to scale at this stage.
The next step is to consider the continuous aspect of the labor adjustment process.
























































where we have used the properties of the truncated normal distribution repeatedly, together
with equations (15) and (18). This regression can be run on the subset of ﬁrms that adjust















terms that account for the fact that we are selecting only the ﬁrms that are adjusting their
level of employment. A two step strategy can then be adopted. In the ﬁrst step, we estimate














. In the second step, we














in the place of the
true ones.12
The use of the ﬁrms’ adjustment policies allows the identiﬁcation of the total costs of
12Needless to say, one could estimate the two equations in one single step by writing the likelihood function
as an ordered Tobit. The two step strategy used here greatly reduces the computational burden. Indeed,
it is well known that estimating this type of likelihood function in one step tends to give rise to serious
convergence problems (see, for example ?). Eciency is not an issue here because all the standard errors
are computed by the block bootstrap.
18adjustment. In fact, by combining the parameters of the ordered probit (which identify H,
L,a n d! up to a scale) and that of the size of adjustment (which identify the scale), one
can recover the value of (c + k). This is in fact the strategy that, under dierent forms,
has been followed by the literature on factor demand in the presence of adjustment costs
(?). Unfortunately, these estimates do not help to separately identify c and k since the two
parameters enter the structural equations jointly.13 However, the separate identiﬁcation of
c and k can be achieved by considering the implications that our model has for the behavior
of wages, which oer an equation that, with matched data, allows to uniquely identify c.
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ijt is a vector of observable individual characteristics aecting wage growth (such






is an adjustment indicator deﬁned for the ﬁrm
the individual is working for. It equals 1 (1) if the ﬁrm is expanding (shrinking) and zero






is not an indicator for whether the worker
has moved, but one for whether the ﬁrm has changed its labor force.
A ﬁrst approach to estimation is simply to estimate the coecients in (21) by OLS. This










it is clear that wages and employment are jointly determined at the ﬁrm level, so that this
assumption is not likely to hold. Consider an exogenous increase in labor costs, due for
13In principle, the two parameters could be identiﬁed by the non-linearity implied by the the functional
form assumptions of the adjustment thresholds. In practice, this identiﬁcation strategy is very tenuous when
not supplemented by the information coming from the wage equation.
19example to a change in the bargaining procedure for wage determination or an increase in
the minimum wage. The ﬁrm might respond to this by reducing employment, against the







is supposed to be related to gross labor adjustment, we
only observe net labor adjustment. This is a standard measurement error argument, which









6= 0. Both problems can be dealt with by using
Instrumental Variables (IV).
To summarize, the identiﬁcation procedure entails the following steps:
1. Obtain a measure of idiosyncratic shocks to the marginal product of labor (%jt)( s e e
below);
2. Estimate (19), i.e., an ordered probit for negative, zero, and positive adjustments using






3. Estimate the size of adjustment equation (20) using data on adjusting ﬁrms.
4. Estimate the (worker level) wage change equation (21) including an indicator of the
ﬁrms’ adjusting policy, accounting for endogeneity;
5. Recover the main structural parameters of interest c, k, !,  from the reduced form
estimates of the previous four steps using optimal minimum distance.
If one uses the theoretical restrictions imposed on H and L, the thresholds of the
adjustment decision, the model is over-identiﬁed with three overidentifying restrictions. In
what follows we use optimal minimum distance on the reduced form estimates to recover
estimates of the structural parameters. We use the block bootstrap-generated covariance
matrix (based on 200 replications) as the weighting matrix. We do not use the theoretical
restriction on L because, as (17) shows, it depends on a square root term that is not deﬁned
for some values of the parameters, and so we have two overidentifying restrictions.
Note that we can separately identify c and k, but  cannot be identiﬁed. Given
that  =1+(1  2p)  1, our estimates will provide lower bounds for the true costs of
adjustments. We will return to these point when discussing the results.
206R e s u l t s
6.1 Employment adjustment
We start by documenting the lumpiness of employment adjustment. Figure 1 plots the
distribution of employment changes pooling all years together, excluding for readability the
ﬁrst and last percentile of the distribution (approximately + and -100). The ﬁrst thing
to note is that the amount of adjustment is fairly modest: about 95% of the observations
lie between 28 and +25. The median employment change is exactly zero (the mean is
similar), and about 17% of the ﬁrms in our sample do not change their employment from
one year to the next; 40% adjust downward, and 42% adjust upward. Not surprisingly, this
indicates that lumpiness is an important component of the employment choice.
The model predicts that ﬁrms will respond to changes in the marginal product of labor
induced by shocks to productivity. We do not have a direct measure of it. There are two
strategies one could follow to obtain an estimate of the productivity shock. The ﬁrst is
to be fully faithful to the structural model and obtain an estimate of the shock from esti-
mation of the production function (4). The second is to follow the previous literature on
q-models of adjustment (?) and estimate a reduced form equation for the change in value
added and use the residual of this equation as an estimate of the shock. Both strategies
have advantages as well as disadvantages. The ﬁrst strategy is consistent with the model,
but given the endogeneity of labor, requires ﬁnding instruments that are powerful enough
to allow identiﬁcation of the production function parameters. The structural model, in this
respect, provides no hints of which instruments could be valid or useful.14 The second strat-
egy requires assuming that we have the correct speciﬁcation for the reduced form equation
for value added. The advantage, however, is that it does not require ﬁnding instruments
outside the model. Moreover, the production function parameters are still identiﬁed from
other moments of the data. In the end, given the lack of adequate instruments, we have
followed the second strategy. Given that we want our shock not to reﬂect ﬁrm ﬁxed eects,
we estimated a speciﬁcation in ﬁrst dierences. In particular, we regressed value added (in
14Attempts of estimating the production function gave very unstable results due to the low power of the
instruments (lags of the endogenous variables).
21thousand of 1991 euros) at time t divided by employment at time t  1, yt = VA t
lt31 (the
change in value added/lagged labor)15 on a full set of time dummies, regional dummies, and
industry dummies.16 This is in fact in line with the theoretical counterpart, where labor
adjustment is prompted by changes in productivity.17
As argued above, the costs estimated using idiosyncratic shocks will be related to those
entailed by an employer change in the local market rather than to long distance geographical
mobility. In fact, by netting out time, region and industry eects, we are excluding shocks
that change aggregate labor demand, and focus on those that only shift the demand of
each single ﬁrm relatively to the others. Most of these changes will be resolved by job
changes that do not entail signiﬁcant geographical mobility. This is conﬁrmed by our data:
by considering the location of the employer, we ﬁnd that 33% of workers that change job
remain within the same municipality, 63% within the same province, and 75% within the
same region (see Table 7).18
We then run an ordered probit for the choice of employment change regime (positive,
zero, or negative change in employment). Table 2 reports the results for the regression with
the shock as sole regressor in column 1. We ﬁnd that the eect of the shock is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant, as expected: larger shocks imply a higher likelihood of moving
from negative to zero to positive adjustments.19 The two adjustment thresholds are also
precisely estimated with signs in line with theoretical predictions. Note that such estimates
15As usual in this type of regressions, we scale value added with the lagged value of employment to avoid
simultaneity biases with the left-hand side variable. The use of current value added is justiﬁed by the idea
that, due to “time to build”, it might take some time before new workers are fully operative. We also
experimented with lagged value added, obtaining very similar results.
16Given that, due to accounting rules or special events, such as acquisitions, mergers or breaking-ups,
balance sheet data might record extreme values related to events beyond our interests, we run a procedure
to exclude outliers. In particular, we exclude the ﬁrst and last percentile of the resulting shock distribution.
The distribution is in fact characterized by extreme values. The median value of the shock is -239 euros, the
ﬁrst and the extreme percentiles are -45,865 and 42,787 euros. We also exclude ﬁrms whose employment
increases more than 20-folds and those that have negative growth greater than 90% in absolute value and
an initial size of more than 100.
17We have also experimented with a shock obtained as the residual of a ﬁrm ﬁxed egects regression with
year dummies. In this case, a shock is measured as the deviation of value added per worker from a ﬁrm-
speciﬁc average. This deﬁnition is less in line with the model; at the same time, the level of productivity has
a more natural interpretation than changes in productivity in terms of state variable. Results are similar to
those reported in the paper.
18Italy is divided into 20 regions and about 100 provinces. A province is roughly of the same size as a US
county.
19In all cases, to account for generated regressor bias, we calculate the standard errors by the block
bootstrap, based on 500 replications.
22are identiﬁed up to scale, so that their size cannot be interpreted directly. However, we can
already infer from these estimates that the (total) costs of adjustment are nonzero.
One potential criticism to this regression, especially when considered in conjunction
with the size of adjustment one that follows, is the lack of any exclusion restriction, so
that identiﬁcation of the eects only comes from functional form assumptions (?). We have
experimented using the number of periods since last adjustment as an exclusion restric-
tion.20 In fact, in general models where productivity follows a random walk as in ?,t h e
martingale property implies that the expected value of the shock (and therefore the size of
the adjustment) is not dependent on the number of periods elapsed since last adjustment,
while the variance (and therefore the likelihood of adjusting) increases with them. This
makes the number of periods since last adjustment a natural candidate for an exclusion
restriction relative to the size of adjustment equation. Results from adding this variable
are reported in column 2. Adding the exclusion restriction has no eect on the estimates.
The number of periods since last adjustment has a positive and signiﬁcant coecient. To
improve precision, we use this speciﬁcation for the rest of the exercise.
Using the estimates of the ordered probit, we construct the variables included in the size
of adjustment equation (20), that we run on ﬁrms that do adjust. We ﬁnd that the shock
has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the size of adjustment (Table 3). The estimate of
the other two coecients have the correct theoretical signs, but are quite imprecise. In fact,
one typically obtains much more precise estimates on the discrete margin (adjust/don’t),
while, conditioning on this, the additional information obtained from the continuous one is
rather limited. The relative precision of the estimates will in any case be taken into account
by our optimal minimum distance procedure to recover the structural parameters.
6.2 Wage adjustment
To disentangle the external and internal components of total adjustment costs, we now
turn to the wage equation. We construct wages as the sum of annual normal compensation







20This variable is, of course, subject to left censoring.
23equals 1 if the ﬁrm is reducing employment, 1 if it is expanding it and zero otherwise. As
s h o w ni ne q u a t i o n2 1 ,t h ec o e cient on this variable is crucial for the identiﬁcation of the
extent of mobility costs, c.
In Table 4 we report the results of the wage growth equation. We include the usual
regressors of wage equations suggested by the literature, i.e. age, tenure, year, sector,
geographical area, and job title dummies;21 since we estimate a wage change equation, we
also net out all time invariant-individual speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity. The variable of
interest is the employment policy of the ﬁrm at which the worker is currently attached. The






assumed exogenous. The results,
reported in column 1, show that adjustment does entail external costs: the (reduced form)
estimate of c is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, with a bootstrap standard error one
order of magnitude lower. In absolute terms, the value is rather modest: it implies that
expanding ﬁrms pay a yearly premium of 131 euros to their workers. Note that this is an
estimate of c, not of the mobility cost c alone. Given that  < 1, it represents a lower
bound for the cost of adjusting, a point to which we will come back later.
All other regressors in our wage change equation have estimated eects that are in line
with expectations: wage growth decreases with age and tenure (reﬂecting concavity of the
wage level functions with respect to such variables). The wage of male workers increases on
average by 328 euros more that than of females, and blue and white collar are characterized
by lower wage growth than managers (the excluded category). Wages also grow less in the
South (results not reported). Given that these estimates are very stable throughout the
speciﬁcations, we will not comment on them any more in what follows.
Even keeping in mind the lower bound argument, the wage premium attached to mobility
seems surprisingly low. In fact, the conventional wisdom is that the Italian labor market is
characterized by a low willingness of workers to move in the face of better job opportunities.
Part of the explanation can be traced back to the fact that we are considering idiosyncratic
ﬁrm shocks, so that mobility tends to resolve mostly locally. Even so, the value we estimate
would imply that mobility costs represents a very small fraction of total adjustment costs.
21There are four sectors (manufacturing, constructions, retailing, other), three geographical areas (north,
center, south), and three occupations (blue collar, white collar, manager).
24However, the estimate may be low simply because it is downward biased due to the fact
that the wage and employment adjustments are determined simultaneously, as discussed
above. To account for this, in column (2) we use an IV procedure - using the shock to value






. The results change quite dramatically, conﬁrming
the importance of the endogeneity issue. The estimate of c increases by one order of
magnitude to 1.3, or 1,300 euros.
Up to now, we have assumed that labor is homogeneous. Appendix B extends the basic
model by allowing for heterogeneous labor in terms of both the contribution to production
and the mobility cost, assuming ﬁxed proportions in the demand of dierent types of labor.
In our data, we observe the workers’ occupational status: production, non production and
managers. These workers might face dierent mobility costs, for example due to dierent
degree of speciﬁcity of their human capital. In Table 5 we allow for heterogeneity in mobil-







wage equation vary for the three categories. We ﬁnd a nice monotonic relationship, i.e.,the
mobility cost increases going from production to non production to managers, with statis-
tically signiﬁcant coecients. For an expanding ﬁrm it is 3.5 times more costly to attract
managers than blue collars, while white collars have only marginally higher mobility costs.
6.3 Structural estimates
As discussed above, our model is overidentiﬁed. In Table 6 we use optimal minimum
distance (OMD) on the reduced form parameters to back up the structural parameters.
Deﬁne the distance vector between the reduced form parameters b and the function f ()
of the structural parameters , b  f (), where  =
³
! l c k
´0
, (see Appendix
C for more details). Our optimal minimum distance procedure consists of
min
 (b  f ())
0 W(b  f ())
The weighting matrix of OMD is obtained from the block bootstrap. We do not use the
theoretical restriction on L because, as (17) shows, it depends on a square root term that is
not deﬁned for some values of the parameters, and so we have 2 overidentifying restrictions.
25The results show that the coecients of interest are all very precisely estimated, and
the test of overidentifying restrictions signals a good ﬁt of the model - despite its simplicity.
T h ee s t i m a t eo f! (the curvature of the production function) is about 1.5. The estimate of
the scale, l, is around 40. Both coecients are well measured. The “implied” estimates
of H and L obtained using the estimates from Table 2 and the estimate of l are 8.22
and 9.23, respectively, implying that ﬁrms adjust upward if they are at least 8 workers
below the frictionless optimal level and downward if they are 9 or more above.22 The
estimate of (c+k) is 11,818 euro. Due to the presence of the scaling parameter  < 1, this
only represents a lower bound for the absolute level of total adjustment costs. However,
the relative contribution of internal and external costs is identiﬁed from the ratio of the
estimate of c, equal to 1,283, and k, equal to 10,535. Our results imply that the latter
clearly dominates, accounting for around 89% of total costs. Still, the share attributable
to moving costs is non trivial and shows that, by disregarding this component, one would
overestimate the internal costs of adjustment.
W h i l ew eh a v en od i r e c tm e a s u r eo f that may be used to pin down the absolute level
of total adjustment costs, some inference can be drawn for illustrative purposes. Assume
that  = .96, in line with the fact that our data are annualized. Recalling that  =
1  (2p  1) and that 1/2  p  1, it follows that  varies between 0.04 (p =1 /2, or no
persistence)and 1 (full persistence). This implies that the costs of adjusting are included in
the rage 11,818  (c+k)  295,450. While indicative of the bounds, the range is too wide
to provide an idea of the size of the costs. We use our data to get an empirical counterpart
to p, the measure of productivity persistence. To map actual productivity changes into the
two state space of the model, we adopt the following strategy. We ﬁrst estimate an AR(1)
regression of %t onto %t31 (using the %t32 as an instrument), ﬁnding a coecient of
0.39.23 We then use the fact that the transition probability for shocks can be written as
Pr{%t|%t31} =( 1 p)(%g+%b)+(2p1)%t31. Then, in a regression of %t on %t31 the AR(1)
22The “implied” estimates are obtained dividing the threshold estimates from the ordered probit equation
(Table 2) by the OMD estimate of the scale parameter jl. An alternative way to obtain estimates of 
H and

L is to use the expressions (16) and (17) and the estimates of the structural parameters , wc and wk from
Table 6. We ﬁnd that this alternative estimate of 
H is identical to the one reported in Table 6. However,
since b wc(b wc 3 4b ) < 0, the alternative estimate of 
L is not deﬁned.
23We don’t observe the level of the productivity shock, just its ﬁrst digerence. However, the AR(1) process
26coecient  can be used to obtain the corresponding value of p = 1
2(1 + )=0 .695. Using
this and  = .96, we obtain a value for  =0 .6256, which implies a total cost of adjusting
employment of approximately 18,890 euros, or 13 months of gross compensation.24 Internal
costs are 16,812 euros, equal to almost one year of average pay. If we relate the internal
costs to legal ﬁring costs, our estimates seem reasonable. As seen in the section on the
institutional aspects, costs for a ﬁring ruled as unfair by the judge vary between 2.5 and 6
months of salary for small ﬁrms to up to 15 months in addition to the forgone compensation
between ﬁring and the court’s ruling for large ﬁrms, that represent the majority of our
sample. Our value lies in this range.
Using the same calculations, moving costs are around 2,080 euros. It is harder to assess
how plausible this value is, because there is not even indirect evidence on mobility costs.
Our estimates imply that the cost of changing a job is around 1.5 months of gross salary.
This value seems rather modest. For example, using data from the CPS, ? estimates a
value of switching sector that can be as high as 75% of annual salary. Dierently from
them, we are not restricting the analysis to workers that change sector. Moreover, most of
our job changes take place locally. This is documented in Table 7, that reports the share
of workers moving within a given geographical area when changing job. Approximately
one third of job changes are conﬁned within the same municipality, more than half within
t h es a m eL o c a lL a b o rS y s t e m( L L S ) , 25 two thirds within the same province, and less that
0jt = 40jt31 + vjt
can be ﬁrst-digerenced to obtain:
{0jt = 4{0jt31 + {vjt
Note that OLS will be invalid because E ({vjt|{0jt31) 6= 0. However, {0jt32 c a nb eu s e da sa ni n s t r u -
ment.
24Previous studies have also ﬁnd signiﬁcant costs of adjusting employment. For example, using direct
measures the costs of termination from survey data for France in 1992, ? ﬁnd values in the range of 17,000
and 40,000 euros. Digerently from their study, our measure also incorporates any indirect cost of adjusting,
such as that coming from productive disruption; moreover, it represents the sum of both the internal and
the external adjustment cost.
25LLS are deﬁned as groups of municipalities characterized by a self-contained labor market with intense
commuting, as determined by the National Statistical Institute on the basis of the degree of work-day
commuting by the resident population. Using 1991 census data, the NSI procedure identiﬁed 784 LLSs
2720 percent entails a change of macro area (North-East, North-West, Center, South and
Islands). If we exclude neighboring macro areas, where mobility might still be local for
workers located close to the boundaries, then long distance mobility is even lower. In Panel
B of the table we report mobility ﬂows across macro areas. The only substantial ﬂows that
surely entail long distance mobility are those from the poor and high unemployment regions
of the South and Islands to the rich regions of the North. These ﬂows are part of a secular
migration movement South to North that characterizes the Italian labor market. If we
exclude this ﬂow, there is little evidence that ﬁrms satisfy their employment needs on the
whole national territory, as seems more common in the US labor market: most of the job
changes occur locally. The picture that emerges is therefore one of fairly high segmentation
across local labor markets, while the cost of moving within each market is contained though
not negligible.26
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed and implemented a method for distinguishing between the
internal and the external component of the costs of adjusting employment at the level of
the ﬁrm. We ﬁnd that the external costs, ignored by the previous literature, are non trivial,
but that the internal ones account for a larger proportion of total labor adjustment costs.
These results have important policy implications. Adjustment costs imply that labor
might not be allocated to its most productive utilization. Reducing them would imply a
more ecient allocation of resources. From this perspective, our results indicate that, while
mobility is an issue, larger gains would occur from reducing adjustment costs internal to
the ﬁrm, such as ﬁring restrictions or other impediments to employment changes.
This does not imply that mobility costs are unimportant. Indeed, as already stressed
above, our estimates of the moving costs should be interpreted as related to costs of changing
employer locally, rather than location or sector. An important extension would be to apply
covering the whole national territory.
26This feature is consistent with the traditional view of industrial clusters, where workers move fairly
easily within the local market. This is one of the main features of industrial district, that are an important
component of the Italian economy (see, for example, ?).
28this paper’s methodology to measure the cost of long-range mobility, a task that we plan
to undertake in future work.
A Appendix: Model solution
Consider ﬁrst the optimal adjustment level. It is easier to work with the marginal shadow
value of labor, that in equilibrium also follows the two state structure:
Vg = Fl(lg,%g)  wg + [pVg  (1  p)Vb]
Vb = Fl(lb,%b)  wb + [pVb  (1  p)Vg]
Optimality requires that Vb = k and Vg = h: by ﬁring an additional worker a ﬁrm pays
k, so it will ﬁre workers until the marginal product of labor is k; similarly, when hiring it
pays h, so the marginal worker must be worth exactly h. Substituting we obtain:
h = Fl(lg,%g)  wg + [ph  (1  p)k] (22)
k = Fl(lb,%b)  wb + [(1  p)h  pk] (23)
By using Fl = %  !l and after some algebra (7) follows.
To obtain equilibrium levels, note that (3), (22), (23) and the condition lg + lb =1a r e
four equations in four unknown that can be solved out to yield:
lg =
%  (c + k + h)+!
2!
lb =









(%g + %b  c  (1  )(h  k)  !)
Consider now the optimality of adjusting. To save on notation, deﬁne Vji = V (li,%j).
Then, the recursive equations for the value of the ﬁrm in the four states, conditional on
adjustment being optimal are:
Vgg = Fgg  wglg + (pVgg +( 1 p)Vgb) (24)
Vbb = Fbb  wblb + (pVbb +( 1 p)Vbg) (25)
Vgb = Vbb  kl (26)
Vbg = Vgg  hl (27)
29Then, substitute to reduce the system to two equations in two unknowns:
Vgg = Fgg  wglg + (pVgg +( 1 p)Vbb  (1  p)kl) (28)
Vbb = Fbb  wblb + (pVbb +( 1 p)Vgg  (1  p)hl) (29)
To determine the optimality of increasing employment when productivity switches from
%b to %g we use Bellman’s optimality principle, and check if deviating from one period
delivers a higher payo with respect to following the optimal policy. For adjustment to be
optimal, it must be that
Vbg = Fgg  wglg + (pVgg +( 1 p)Vbb  (1  p)kl)  hl 
>F bg  wblb + {pVgg  phl +( 1 p)Vbb)} (30)
Simplifying,
Fgg  wglg  ((1  p)k +( 1 p)h)l  Fbg  wblb (31)
Using the quadratic production function and the relations (l2
g l2
b)=( lg lb)(lg +lb)=
l, wb = wg  c and substituting for wg the condition simpliﬁes to
%2  (c +2 ( h + k))% + ((c + k + h)(h + k)  c!) > 0
This is a quadratic in % whose solution is (9). Similar calculations yield the condition
(10).
B Appendix: Heterogeneous labor
This appendix shows how the model can be extended to allow for dierent mobility costs
for dierent workers. We use this extension as the basis for a wage equation where we
identify the mobility costs of dierent types of workers. At the level of the ﬁrm, we only
observe employment changes and not which workers are hired ore laid o, so that we cannot
separately estimate ﬁring costs for the dierent types of workers. We assume that dierent
workers are used in production in ﬁxed proportions, which implies that the ﬁrm always
modify employment in the same proportion, making the identity of movers irrelevant from
the ﬁrm’s perspective. This arguably strong assumption can be defended on the ground
that we will distinguish between production workers, non production workers and managers,
whose degree of substitutability is likely to be rather limited.
Labor is heterogeneous in production. Each worker’s problem is identical to the one
in Section 3. There are two types of workers (but extending the model to n types is
immediate), P (production) and N (non production), that dier both for their contribution
to production (see below) and for their moving cost, cs, s = P,N. In each period, a worker
is employed in a “good” or a “bad” ﬁrm, which pay wages ws
g and ws
b respectively. Applying
the same reasoning for each type of worker as in Section 3 , we obtain:
wN
g = wN
b + cN (32)
wP
g = wP
b + cP (33)
Firms produce output using a mix of the two types of workers in ﬁxed proportion.
30We deﬁne eective labor l as obtained by combining the two types of labor P,N in ﬁxed
proportion:






lN}, 0  a  1.
This speciﬁcation implies that 1 unit of eective labor l is obtained combining 1  a units
of lP and a units of lN,s ot h a ta is the share of N type workers in the total labor force.
Given the wages wN and wP,t h ee e c t i v ew a g er a t ei s
w = awN +( 1 a)wP
At an optimum, lN = al and lP =( 1 a)l. At the level of the ﬁrm, we can therefore
consider directly l, weighting each type of labor for its share. Note that, from (32-33), it
follows that
wg  wb = awN
g +( 1 a)wP
g  awN




b )+( 1 a)(wP
g  wP
b )=(acN +( 1 a)cP)=c
The wage change by eective unit of labor can be expressed as a weighted average of the
mobility costs of each type of worker. One can therefore solve the ﬁrm problem using the
labor data directly, without distinguishing between P and N. The analysis in the main
text then applies. The full model solution follows the one in the previous appendix and is
available from the authors on request.
C Appendix: The minimum distance mapping
The objective of the minimum distance procedure is to minimize the distance between the
vector of reduced form parameters b,a n df (), a function of the structural parameters
 =
¡
! l c k
¢0. The exact mapping is as follows:
b =
3
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where bE,V is the reduced form estimate of the coecient on variable V (V = UT the upper















,a n dt h eI Vs+ s3)i ne q u a t i o nE (E = OP ordered
probit, SA size of adjustment, and W wage equation). In practice, in our OMD procedure
we do not use bOP,LT,a n ds ob contains only 6 elements. Since  contains 4 parameters,
there are two overidentifying restrictions overall.
31Table 1
Firms’ and workers’ characteristics
Panel A reports summary statistics for the ﬁrms in our data set. Panel B shows descriptive statistics
for the sample of workers. All statistics refer to 1991. The matched ﬁrm sample includes ﬁrms that
area matched at least once with a worker in the workers’ data set.
P a n e lA :F i r mc h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
Mean Stand. dev.
Whole sample Matched sample Whole sample Matched sample
Value added (thousand euros) 8,712 15,485 127,028 116,589
Number of employees 203 370 2355 2642
South 0.0884 0.0892 0.2839 0.2851
Center 0.1627 0.1672 0.3691 0.3731
North 0.7489 0.7436 0.4337 0.4367
Manufacturing 0.7750 0.7964 0.4176 0.4027
Construction 0.1549 0.1317 0.3619 0.3382
Retail 0.0253 0.0278 0.1571 0.1644
Services 0.0447 0.0441 0.2067 0.2052
P a n e lB :W o r k e r s ’c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
Mean Stand. dev.
Whole sample Matched sample Whole sample Matched sample
Earnings (thousand euros) 16.94 17.25 9.39 9.02
Age 38.93 39.15 10.43 10.40
Male 0.7284 0.7423 0.4448 0.4374
Productions 0.6164 0.6188 0.4863 0.4857
Clericals 0.3662 0.3655 0.4818 0.4816
Managers 0.0173 0.0157 0.1305 0.1242
South 0.1427 0.1244 0.3498 0.3301
Center 0.1880 0.1859 0.3907 0.3890
North 0.6693 0.6897 0.4705 0.4626
32Table 2
Employment Adjustment: Ordered probit estimates
Dependent variable: a discrete variable taking the value -1 for negative employment changes,
0 for no changes, and 1 for positive changes. Firm shock is the residual in ﬁrst dierences of a
regression of value added per (lagged) worker on year, sector, and regional dummies. Bootstrap














N. periods since last adj. 0.0151
(0.0055)
# observations 84,771 84,771
33Table 3
Employment Adjustment: size of the adjustment
The dependent variable is employment change from one year to the next. The regression only
include adjusting ﬁrms. See Table 3 for the deﬁnition of the ﬁrm shock. The other two variables
are functionals of the normal p.d.f. and c.d.f. obtained from the estimates of the ordered probit of













The dependent variable is yearly wage change (in thousand euros). For stayers, the change
is computed as the dierence in the wage from year to year; for movers, it is the change in the
annualized wage following the job move. All regressions include sector (1 digit: manufacturing,
constructions, retailing, other), year, and location (3 macro-areas: north, center, south) dummies.
s+is a dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrm the worker is employed at has increased its workforce in the
current year; s3is one if it has decreased it. Bootstrap standard errors are in parenthesis.
Regressor OLS IV
(1) (2)
























N. obs. 104,798 85,673
35Table 5
Wage Adjustment, Controlling for heterogeneity
The dependent variable is yearly wage change (in thousand euros). See Table 4 for details.
Regressor IV
(1)
(s+  s)×Blue collar 1.1562
(0.0891)
(s+  s)×White collar 1.3837
(0.4245)














Optimal Minimum Distance results
The table reports structural estimates of the parameters, obtained by applying OMD to the
reduced form regression coecients. The “implied” estimates are obtained dividing the threshold
estimates from the ordered probit equation (Table 2) by the OMD estimate of the scale parameter













(2 d.f.; p-value 16.34%)
37Table 7
Workers’ geographical mobility
The ﬁrst panel reports the share of workers that move within a given geographical unit. LLS
are local labor systems (see footnote 25); Macro-areas are the ones reported in the second panel of
the table. The second panel reports the matrix of mobility ﬂows across macro areas.
Panel A: Share of mobility within:
Municipality LLS Province Region Macro-Area
.33 .54 .63 .74 .81
P a n e lB :M o b i l i t yA c r o s sM a c r oA r e a s
To
N-W N-E Center South Islands N. Obs.
From
N-W 0.86 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.01 3627
N-E 0.11 0.84 0.03 0.01 0.01 2276
Center 0.18 0.06 0.68 0.07 0.01 1030
South 0.21 0.07 0.13 0.56 0.03 382
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Figure 1: Histogram of employment changes
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